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 Jürgen Mittag 
Escaping the                                          
Legitimacy-Accountability-Trap? 
Perspectives of Parliamentary Participation in        
European Security and Defence Policy 
Introduction  
Since the early 1980s foreign and security policy has attracted growing at-
tention at the European level. To an increasing extent European summits 
and Intergovernmental Conferences have dealt with foreign affairs and 
provided the European Union with new powers.
1 Throughout the last years 
the formation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has 
belonged to the most prominent and dynamical developments of European 
integration. From an academic point of view the European Security and 
Defence Policy has been analysed as “the ultimate challenge”,
2 while it is 
 
1   See basically Wolfgang Wessels/David Allen/Reinhardt Rummel (eds.): Die Eu-
ropäische Politische Zusammenarbeit, Bonn 1978; Simon Nutall: European Political 
Co-Operation, Oxford 1992; Elfriede Regelsberger/Philippe de Schoutheete de Ter-
varent/Wolfgang Wessels (eds.): Foreign Policy of the European Union. From EPC 
to CFSP and Beyond, Boulder 1997; Ben Soetendorp: Foreign Policy in the Euro-
pean Union. Theory, History and Practice, London 1999 and Simon Nutall: Euro-
pean Foreign Policy, Oxford 2000.  
2   Jolyon Howorth: European integration and defence: the ultimate challenge? Chaillot 
Paper 43, Paris 2000. Jürgen Mittag 
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regarded among political actors “to be one of [the] main projects of the EU 
in coming years”.
3  
Reasons bringing security and defence policy to the European level could 
be traced back to three major considerations. 1) Previous European defence 
institutions − namely WEU and ESDI within the NATO − have not been 
considered as effective. The embarrassment caused by the failing of Euro-
pean bodies and institutions in the crisis of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, 
particularly in Kosovo, forced the EU member states to look for more co-
herent alternatives. 2) In view of its economic power the European Union 
has developed to a relevant player in the international system. The en-
gagement in single market related fields such as trade or development pol-
icy is closely interwoven with foreign matters. Hence, the European Union 
can no longer reject the need to play a more capable and visible role in the 
international system including security and defence issues. 3) Confronted 
with reduced national (defence) budgets the European Union is increas-
ingly considered by its member states as a framework for a stronger and 
more efficient involvement of nation states in international affairs. Based 
on these notions, the European Union in the past years has introduced 
European Security and Defence Policy in addition to the already existing 
elements of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
4  
Starting with a brief overview on recent developments and missions in 
ESDP this paper first raises the question of public support in this policy 
field focussing on the discussion about legitimacy. Stressing the role of 
parliaments, the study then analyses the current institutional arrangements 
for ESDP at the EU level in terms of legitimacy or − more concretely − 
voice, scrutiny, transparency and accountability. Based on an analysis 
 
3    Speech by Javier Solana at the 40th Commanders Conference of the German 
Bundeswehr in Bonn, 11 October 2005.  
4    Cf. for the political and academic debate on these aspects Hans-Georg Ehrhart 
(eds.): Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Positionen, Perzepti-
onen, Probleme, Perspektiven, Baden-Baden 2002; Werner Hoyer/Gerd F. Kaldrack 
(eds.): Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP). Der Weg zu in-
tegrierten Streitkräften?, Baden-Baden 2002; Erich Reiter/Reinhardt Rummel/Peter 
Schmidt (eds.): Europas ferne Streitmacht. Chance und Schwierigkeiten der Euro-
päischen Union beim Aufbau der ESVP, Hamburg 2002. Escaping the Legitimacy-Accountability-Trap? 
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where parliaments at the EU level come in and where their room for ma-
noeuvre is limited the paper concludes with ten options for prospective par-
liamentary participation in ESDP. 
Patterns of Institutionalisation and Differentiation  
At the summit in Cologne on 3/4 June 1999, the heads of state and gov-
ernment of the EU-member states agreed on a declaration which can be 
considered as the “naissance” of an autonomous ESDP stating: “We, the 
members of the European Council, are resolved that the European Union 
shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to 
give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its 
responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and de-
fence”.
5 As regards the aims formulated at the Franco-British Summit in St. 
Malo in December 1998, it has been decided in Cologne to create new 
permanent political and military bodies within the Council structure in or-
der to provide military expertise and support to the ESDP. Half a year later, 
the presidency conclusions at the European Council in Helsinki on 10/11
 
December 1999 recalled the guiding principles agreed in Cologne. The 
headline goal of establishing the framework for independent EU-missions 
and the so-called Rapid Reaction Forces (RPF) demonstrate a milestone in 
the process of political integration. In response to international crisis, the 
member states committed to the target of being able “by 2003, to deploy 
within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 
50.000-60.000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks”.
6  
Based on these decisions, new institutions have been created in the follow-
ing months such as the military committee, the military staff, and, above 
all, the new coordination centre of ESDP: the Political and Security Com-
 
5   Declaration of the European Council on strengthening the Common European Pol-
icy on Security and Defence, quoted in: Maartje Rutten (ed.): From St-Malo to 
Nice. European Defence: Core Documents, Chaillot Paper 47, p. 41. 
6   It also has been officially stressed that this would “not imply the creation of a Euro-
pean army”. Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of Helsinki, 11 De-
cember 1999, quoted in: Maartje Rutten (ed.): From St-Malo to Nice. European 
Defence: Core Documents, Chaillot Paper 47, p. 82.  Jürgen Mittag 
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mittee (PSC). Besides its military dimension the ESDP included as well 
civilian capacities. In June 2000 the European Council in Feira decided to 
provide by 2003 “up to 5.000 police officers for international missions 
across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations”.
7 
In Nice, the European Council officially approved the presidency report on 
a European Security and Defence Policy. The Nice treaty provided the le-
gal basis for the Political and Security Committee (Article 25 TEU) which 
was made responsible for both CFSP and ESDP.
8 Despite the fact that 
CFSP and ESDP still follow intergovernmental rules, the invention of a 
new institutional set-up has shifted the decision-making process at least 
partially to the EU level in Brussels.  
Since the coming-into-force of the Nice Treaty in February 2003, the insti-
tutional alteration has lost dynamic. The proposals of the European Con-
vention and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, however, 
would have produced several innovations for provisions within the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy and ESDP such as the creation of the post 
of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, the preparatory work on the setting 
of an external action service, the solidarity clause, the extension of the Pe-
tersberg tasks and new possibilities of flexibility for the member states to 
cooperate more closely in the field of defence.
9 Further decisions to de-
 
7   Presidency Conclusions on the European Council of Santa Maria da Feira, 20 June 
2000, quoted in: Maartje Rutten (eds.): From St-Malo to Nice, European Defence: 
Core Documents, Chaillot Paper 47, p.120.  
8   According to the treaty provisions, the PSC has three major tasks: “Monitoring po-
tential crisis situations affecting the EU, helping to formulate EU foreign and secu-
rity policies and, during a future crisis situation, contributing to decisions about the 
political control and strategic decisions of any EU-organised operations.” Presi-
dency Conclusions on the European Council of Nice, 9 December 2000, quoted in: 
Maartje Rutten (eds.): From St-Malo to Nice, European Defence: Core Documents, 
Chaillot Paper 47, p. 191f. 
9   Cf. Franco Algieri/Thomas Bauer: Eine Frage der Macht: Die EU auf dem Weg 
zum sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitischen Akteur mit globaler Reichweite, in: 
Werner Weidenfeld (ed.): Die Europäische Verfassung in der Analyse, Gütersloh 
22005, pp. 205-227; Udo Diedrichs/Mathias Jopp: Die Sicherheits- und Verteidi-
gungspolitik der EU nach dem Verfassungsvertrag: Innovationen, Experimente, Im-
pulse, in: Mathias Jopp/Saskia Matl (eds.): Der Vertrag über eine Verfassung für 
Europa – Analysen zur Konstitutionalisierung der EU, Baden-Baden 2005, pp. 343-
366.  Escaping the Legitimacy-Accountability-Trap? 
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velop security and defence policy have been taken although the war in Iraq 
and particularly the so-called Brussels “praline summit” in April 2003 − 
where perspectives for an autonomous operational military command out-
side the Nato structure were debated − revealed deep-rooted controversies 
between the EU member states: In December 2003 the European Council 
approved the proposal for a “European Security Strategy” which has been 
drafted by the High Representative Javier Solana in order to exploit a con-
vincing case for more coherence, capability and forward thinking in coun-
tering new security threats. In July 2004 the “European Defence Agency” 
has been established by a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers in order 
to enhance potential in development, research and acquisition. The most 
recent progress was the decision on the so-called “battle groups” which 
should reinforce the ESDP militarily. 
Even more noteworthy than the institutional dynamic of the European Se-
curity and Defence Policy is the operational progress. In summer 2006 the 
EU can look already upon nine ongoing and five completed missions. On 1 
January 2003 the EU has started to deploy 395 police officers to Bosnia-
Herzegovina to replace the International Police Task Force for civil crisis 
management of the United Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In March 2003 
the EU-foreign ministers have decided to take over the NATO-Mission 
“Allied Harmony” in Macedonia by EU-units. This mission would have 
been the first armed action in the framework of the ESDP, if the EU had 
not decided on 12 June 2003 to deploy a 1.500-man troop that was mainly 
comprised of French soldiers to be in Congo until 1 September 2003. In 
this framework the EU military forces worked under French command 
without relying on NATO equipment. In addition to these actions a grow-
ing number of missions has already been carried out or is planned for the 
near future as the succeeding table illustrates.  
 
 
 
 Jürgen Mittag 
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Ongoing Missions  Completed Missions  
EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina  
(EUPM)  
since 1 January 2003 
EU Military Operation in former Yugoslav Repub-
lic of Macedonia  
(CONCORDIA)  
31 March 2003 until 15 December 2003  
EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
(EUFOR-ALTHEA)  
since 2 December 2004 
EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia  
(PROXIMA)  
15 December 2003 until 14 December 2005 
EU Police Mission in Kinshasa  
(EUPOL “Kinshasa”) 
since April 2005 
EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of 
Congo  
(ARTEMIS)  
12 June 2003 until 1 September 2003 
EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo  
(EUSEC DR Congo) 
since 8 June 2005 (12 months) 
EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia  
(EUJUST THEMIS) 
16 July 2004 until 15 July 2005  
EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq  
(EUJUST LEX) 
since 1 July 2005 
EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia  
(EUPAT)  
15 December 2005 until 14 June 2006 
EU Support to AMIS II (Darfur) 
since 18 July 2005 
 
EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh  
(AMM)  
since 15 September 2005 
 
EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing 
Point in the Palestinian Territories  
(EU BAM Rafah)  
since 30 November 2005 
 
EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories  
(EUPOL COPPS)  
since 1 January 2006 
 
[EU support to the United Nations' mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo]  
(EUFOR RD Congo)  
expected for July 2006  
 
Source: Own compilation based on information by the Council of the European Union. 
 
At the latest the setting-up of autonomous rapid reaction forces has brought 
an end to the long-lasting debate on EU’s categorization as solely civilian 
power. Though the EU follows primarily an approach known as “soft 
power” − intending to have a say without displaying military force – ESDP 
has transformed the European Union to a stronger actor in international 
politics, even in the military field, understood mainly as crisis management 
rather than territorial defence. The inventing of new bodies at the European 
level and the strengthening of EU’s role in international affairs, however, Escaping the Legitimacy-Accountability-Trap? 
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was not appreciated by all sides. On the one hand, serious concern has been 
expressed that the EU is militarily not prepared to fulfil the high expecta-
tions. Therefore an “expectation-capability-gap”
10 has been discussed for 
many years. On the other hand, most recently the question of democratic 
control and public support has produced severe concerns in terms of legiti-
macy and accountability in the political and academic world.
11 
The Legitimacy-Accountability-Gap 
At first sight, public support for ESDP does not cause a problem at all. Ac-
cording to Eurobarometer 64 in autumn 2005 around 68% of all EU citi-
zens were in favour of the principle of a common foreign policy, while just 
21% were against it. A security and defence policy carried out at the EU 
level even obtains a stronger support: More than 77% of the respondents 
declared themselves in favour compared to 15% against.
12 At second view, 
however, the perception of ESDP might be regarded differently taking into 
consideration that a growing number of actions and activities in security 
and defence matters has to be accepted and supported by the citizens. Par-
ticularly with regard to the accomplished and ongoing EU missions it ap-
pears almost certain that the involvement of the European Union in various 
crisis states might lead sooner or later to political troubles when unpopular 
actions have to be taken, operations fail or even soldiers lose their lifes.
13 
The fundamental assumption of this paper is − in view of the Balkan crisis 
in the 1990s and the desperate search for troops for the 2006 Congo mis-
 
10  Cf. especially Christopher Hill: The Capability Expectation Gap, or Conceptualiz-
ing Europe´s International Role, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, September 
1993, pp. 305. 
11  See for political debate Patrick Cox: The European Parliament and ESDP, in: We-
ner Hoyer/Gerd. F. Kaldrack (eds.): Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspo-
litik. Der Weg zu integrierten europäischen Streitkräften, Baden-Baden 2002, pp. 
303-316 and Armin Laschet: Parliamentarisation of the European Security and De-
fence Policy, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 
working paper No. 82, August 2002. 
12  See for statistical data Eurobarometer 64, December 2005.  
13  For example, the debate on the deployment of troops to the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo has produced deep concerns as a German television poll on 20 May 2006 
indicates a ratio of 94 % against this mission.  Jürgen Mittag 
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sion alike −,
14 that the citizens of Europe are the first to point to and to 
criticise the shortcomings of formulation, presentation and implementation 
of ESDP. As an increasing number of decisions will have to be taken in the 
framework of European Security and Defence Policy, legitimacy seems a 
necessary prerequisite. But who ensures legitimacy?   
The multifaceted concept of legitimacy,
15 often considered as “government 
of, by, for the people”
16 can be explained as a “system of governance (…) 
in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by 
citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their 
representatives”.
17 But in how far are the representatives at the EU level 
involved? This question leads in a straight line to the role of parliaments. 
Since parliaments are regularly the only body directly elected by the peo-
ple(s), they are regarded as a core institution of legitimacy in democratic 
systems.  
In view of security and defence, legitimacy has a particular impact, since 
these matters are not comparable to domestic issues. Parliaments in general 
have never had the same degree of participation in foreign and defence pol-
icy as in domestic policy fields. A lot of information in security and de-
fence policy is of confidential or sensitive nature. Since the number of 
actors might affect the success of international actions, parliaments are in-
volved only to a limited extent − merely left with symbolic formal influ-
ence. Nonetheless, parliaments have shown at the national level the ability 
to influence the conduct of defence and security policies by scrutinising the 
actions of the executive, ensuring transparency thus providing a link be-
tween the people and the armed forces. In view of security and defence pol-
 
14   See for the background of the Congo mission 2006 Daniel Göler: Europas Interes-
sen in Zentralafrika. Die Mission “Eufor RD Congo”, in: Dokumente 3 (2006), S. 
22-27. 
15  See for different schools of thoughts Marcus Höreth: Die Europäische Union im 
Legitimationstrilemma: Zur Rechtfertigung des Regierens jenseits der Staatlichkeit, 
Baden-Baden 1999 and Beate Kohler-Koch/Berthold Rittberger (eds.): Debating the 
Democratic Legitimacy of the EU, Lanham (MD) 2006.  
16   Fritz W. Scharpf: Governing in Europe: effective and democratic? Oxford/New 
York 1999, p. 6 − referring to Abraham Lincoln’s famous Gettysburg address 1863. Escaping the Legitimacy-Accountability-Trap? 
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icy at the EU level a different picture appears. Both European defence pol-
icy and European armaments cooperation are currently designed to be 
purely intergovernmental − carried out by national governments in the EU 
framework behind closed doors at the same time as the general exclusion of 
all kinds of parliamentary bodies is highly visible.  
Considering national parliaments it should to be taken into account that the 
role and competences of national parliaments vary broadly in general and 
particularly in the field of security and defence issues. While some parlia-
ments pronounce rights in initiating legislation and supervising the work of 
the respective government, other parliaments act primarily as a platform for 
communication.
18 None of the national parliaments of the EU member 
states has yet developed capacities to act except-half of the own national 
arena acquiring an own access to the EU-institutions or becoming cooked 
part of a European network. However, key decisions on the ESDP will be 
taken at the EU level in the Council.
19  
Competences that practically have been removed from the national parlia-
ments have not been transferred to the European Parliament. Different from 
the EC pillar, the European Parliament has not succeeded in becoming in-
volved and has also been unsuccessful in reinforcing its powers. The 
chance of the EP to achieve more efficient and democratic legitimacy for 
foreign policy is limited by the current Article 21 TEU stating that the 
European Parliament is restricted to “be[eing] kept regularly informed” on 
the development of the Union's CFSP. In view of this provision, it remains 
to reveal that democratic decision-making structures in ESDP seem to slip 
through the prevailing intergovernmental prerogative depriving both the 
 
17   Philippe C. Schmitter: How to Democratize the European Union... And Why 
Bother? Lanham 2000, p. 3. 
18  Some national parliaments, however, are able to take influence on security and de-
fence issues in the national sphere since they can refer to strong information rights 
or rely on constitutional rules in case of deploying forces. According to Daniel 
Thym (Beyond Parliament’s reach? The Role of European Parliament in the CFSP, 
in: European Foreign Affairs Review 1 (2006), pp. 109-127, here p. 122) Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Slo-
vakia and Sweden require parliamentary consent in case of military operations.  Jürgen Mittag 
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national parliament’s and the European Parliament’s oversight. Accord-
ingly, it has to be discussed whether we do not only witness the above men-
tioned “expectation-capability-gap” in view of the operational powers of 
ESDP, but also a “legitimacy-accountability-gap” due to the absence of a 
parliamentary participation in European Security and Defence Policy. This 
gap might actually turn into a trap if the EU will not attempt to change the 
basis of its own legitimacy in accordance with democratic postulates and a 
greater sensitivity for the participation of the people or at least for what is 
called public opinion.  
The aspect of legitimacy is closely interwoven with the question, which 
institutions, legitimated by the people, are able to control the actions and 
instruments of ESDP. Following this notion, it frequently has been criti-
cised that a vacuum has arisen in parliamentary control of foreign and secu-
rity policy because neither the European Parliament − or any other 
“European” parliamentary body
20 − nor the national parliaments are able to 
guarantee scrutiny.
21 In terms of a linkage between legitimacy and scrutiny 
the key question is not only: “Who decides if and how to go to war?” but 
above all: “Who will be held accountable?” Isabelle Ioannides has drawn 
the scenario that an operation might be mandated by the UN, commanded 
by the EU, staffed by the militaries of EU member states, equipped by na-
tional assets and “politically controlled by the supply of military informa-
tion gathered by EU member states, NATO member states (mainly the 
United States) and/or EU candidate states.”
22  
 
19   The bodies established after the European Council of Helsinki (PSC, EUMC, 
EUMS) also have been shaped by the Council. 
20  In addition, it has to be taken into consideration that the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Western European Union − though still existent − has lost its already limited 
impact.  
21  See for the academic debate on this matter Udo Diedrichs: The European Parlia-
ment in CFSP: More than a Marginal Player?, in: The International Spectator 2 
(2004), pp. 31-46; Wolfgang Wagner: Für Europa sterben? Die demokratische Legi-
timität der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, HSFK Report 3 
(2004).  
22  See Isabelle Ioannides: The European Rapid Reaction Force: Implications for de-
mocratic accountability, BICC paper 24, pp. 16f.  Escaping the Legitimacy-Accountability-Trap? 
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In order to prevent disorientation and irresponsibility, it seems necessary 
that parliamentary bodies step in to compensate the loss of accountability, 
thereby preserving the democratic character of decision-making at the 
European level. The institution to attain − mostly but not solely − this role 
is apparently the European Parliament, since it is the only body directly 
elected at the EU level.
23 Following the Eurobarometer surveys of the last 
years, the European Parliament is undoubtedly the institution attracting the 
highest confidence at the European level. It represents the citizens of the 
Union, aggregates and publicises their views, fears and opinions as well as 
it acts on their behalf. Thus, it contributes more or less substantially to en-
hance the legitimacy of the Union. In turn to present a reliable picture of 
European Parliament’s involvement in ESDP the following analysis inves-
tigates in detail the already existing channels of participation and interac-
tion at the European level. 
Means of Parliamentary Participation in ESDP 
Due to the complexity of EC policies, the European Parliament covers po-
litical, economic, cultural and other aspects of foreign policy. Yet, defence 
as an exclusively intergovernmental policy constitutes a dimension of its 
own. The role of the European Parliament in ESDP is neither mentioned in 
any of the declarations adopted since October 1998 nor in any final conclu-
sion of a presidency. In addition to these declarations and conclusions, the 
legal provisions of CFSP (and ESDP) are lined out in Title V TEU.
 Article 
21 TEU, however, gives only imprecise evidence on competences of par-
ticipation for the European Parliament when stating: “The Presidency shall 
consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices 
of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views 
of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The Euro-
pean Parliament shall be kept regularly informed (…). The European Par-
 
23  See for such demands Roland Bieber: Democratic Control of European Foreign 
Policy, in: European Journal of International Law, 1/2 (1990), pp. 148-173 and Re-
imund Seidelmann: Eine neue und demokratische Sicherheitspolitik für die EU, in: 
Andreas Maurer/Burkhard Thiele (eds.): Legitimationsprobleme und Demokratisie-
rung der Europäischen Union, Marburg 1996, pp. 165-180.  Jürgen Mittag 
14   
liament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. 
(…).” Since the objective of Article 21 TEU is merely the “common for-
eign and security policy” − and in view that the proposal of the Convention 
as well as the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” have not sub-
stantially amended this provision − a parliamentary dimension of ESDP 
still lacks a formal legal reference to ESDP.
24  
Information, Consultation and Control  
A certain degree of parliamentary participation in ESDP requires the flow of 
information provided either by the Commissioner, the Council and the 
High Representative or by the presidency. According to concurrent state-
ments of MEPs the information provided by the Council and the European 
Commission is sometimes satisfying and sometimes superficial. Yet, a gen-
eral readiness for information especially through the Commission is 
stressed by many MEPs.
25 Consequently, in the sessions of European Par-
liament’s committees the European Commission is regularly represented. 
In the election period 1999-2004 former Commissioner Chris Patten has 
been 22 times before European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy (AFET) while 
national foreign and defence ministers appeared 54 times.
26 Contradictory 
to the well-established communication by the European Commission and 
the High Representative, Parliamentarians do not consider the information 
by the presidency as satisfying. The MEPs have repeatedly criticised that 
the presidency perceives its information obligations vis-à-vis the EP only 
very generally and vague. Both with respect to the quality and the quantity 
of the information, the presidency is not considered as productive interlocu-
tor by the parliamentarians.  
 
24  Still, article 17 TEU defines that CFSP “shall include all questions relating to the 
security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a defence policy, which 
might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide”. 
25  See for example the statement of MEP Helmut Kuhne (SPE) in context of the Euro-
pean Security Strategy. Dok. PE 349/862v01-00.   
26  Cf. Thym, p. 149.  Escaping the Legitimacy-Accountability-Trap? 
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The way the European Parliament has tried to strengthen its information 
rights can be illustrated by its reaction when the High Representative, fol-
lowing a Council decision,
27 took several decisions in the field of security 
and defence policy that were intended to protect secret or confidential in-
formation.
28 In reaction to this “Solana Decision”, the European Parliament 
made serious plans to take the Council before the European Court of Jus-
tice and claim its right for appropriate information. In July 2002 the situa-
tion was eased when a draft agreement was discussed with the aim to 
ensure that the EP would be informed appropriately about EU defence and 
security policy. This agreement between the EP and the Council − con-
cluded on 20 November 2002 and specified in the subsequent exchange of 
letters in December 2003 − has been a substantial step forward compared to 
the current provisions of Article 21 in terms of timing, scope and quality of 
information.
29 Special significance has attracted the provision that a “secu-
rity committee” is created comprising four MEPs and the chairman of 
AFET which will be informed “of the content of the sensitive informa-
tion”.
30 In view of these instruments, the European Parliament is not the 
favoured addressee of information but widely privileged in obtaining in-
formation vis-à-vis their parliamentary counterparts at the national level.  
Control powers of parliaments are closely related to information rights. Re-
garding the EU level, it can certainly be said that questioning the Commis-
sion, the High Representative − the original instruments of the European 
 
27  In a COREPER meeting in July 2000, a majority of member states decided to cate-
gorise all documents containing information on military or non-military crisis man-
agement. Public access is now refused to documents classified as top secret, secret, 
or confidential, whereas access to all other documents is granted or denied accord-
ing to the previous rules.  
28  Decision of Secretary-General/High Representative of 27 July 2000 on measures for 
the protection of classified information applicable to the General Secretariat of the 
Council. Official Journal C 239, 23 August 2000, p. 1. 
29  See for a critical evaluation of the agreement Malin Tappert: European Parliament 
resigned to limited oversight of ESDP?, in: European Security Review 16 (2003).   
30  Cf. Inter-institutional Agreement of 20 November 2002, Official Journal C 298, 30 
November 2002. See for the background as well Daniela Kietz/Andreas 
Maurer/Christian Völkel: Interinstitutional Agreements in CFSP: Parliamentariza-
tion through the Backdoor, in: European Foreign Affairs Review 2 (2005), pp. 175-
195.  Jürgen Mittag 
16   
Parliament's control opposing the other two institutions – is the major tool 
for control in ESDP. But one has to bear in mind that control and scrutiny 
are primarily reactive and practised − after the decision has been taken or 
the mission has been carried out − when both expenditure and policy ex-
perience can be quite harshly examined. Since the information and control 
of the EP is based to a large extent on the good-will of their interlocutors, 
informal arrangements, long-established forms of personal strings and in-
ternal arrangement play a crucial role in ESDP matters.  
Legislation, Budget and Appointments  
The legal impact of the European Parliament in foreign, security and de-
fence policy can be neglected since it is not entitled to approve or reject 
what the executive has proposed. Parliament’s decision-making in foreign 
and defence issues remains in the shadow of weakness vis-à-vis the rele-
vant actors in this policy field – the governments. The main instrument and 
the doorway to more influence is the budget − both at the European as well 
as the national level. Yet, the budget for external affairs of the European 
Union suffers from financial limitations. The budget has been restricted in 
2005 to 3,5 billion Euro. Out of this amount less than two percent (62,6 
million Euro) are obliged for CFSP.  
Roughly summarised, in CFSP/ESDP budgetary affairs currently exists a 
difference between “administrative” expenditures which are part of the EC 
budget and “operational” expenditures which will also be financed by the 
EC budget unless the Council decides otherwise by unanimity.
31 The inter-
institutional arrangement of 6 May 1999 has made parliamentary rights 
here even more tangible: “Whenever it adopts a decision in the field of 
CFSP entailing expenditure, the Council will immediately and in each case 
send the European Parliament an estimate of the costs envisaged (‘financial 
statement‘), in particular those regarding time-frame, staff employed, use 
of premises and other infrastructure, transport facilities, training require-
 
31  See for details Antonio Missiroli: Euros for ESDP: financing EU operations, ISS 
Occasional Papers 45 (2003). Escaping the Legitimacy-Accountability-Trap? 
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ments and security arrangements.”
32 This agreement leads to a strong form 
of accountability since it requires the Council to communicate immediately 
an estimate of the envisaged costs to the EP. There is, however, one re-
markable exception: “Operations having military or defence implications”, 
have to be financed by the member states.
33 Hence, in view of Article 28(3) 
TEU, military expenditures will not be funded out of the Community 
budget.
34 According to a Council (of Foreign Ministers) decision, there are 
two categories of costs in ESDP: firstly, either common costs of the mem-
ber states, consisting of funds such as those for transport, administration or 
public relations of the staff quarter. Secondly, individual costs, which will 
be taken separately by each member state according to its own expenses. 
The Council based solution can be considered as a compromise between 
countries ready to “merge” their defence expenditures and those disposed 
to adopt NATO’s “costs lie where they fall” principle. The expenses for the 
transport and accommodation of troops will be decided on a case-by-case 
basis. As a result of this arrangement for ESDP (military) affairs, it “is left 
up to the discretion, goodwill and generosity of individual countries, which 
have the additional option of abstaining and thus not paying for common 
missions”.
35 Considering these aspects, it can be revealed that the European 
Parliament has budgetary rights as for instance regarding police missions 
but no budgetary powers in the military area due to the absence of a com-
mon European defence budget.  
Besides budgetary legislation the participation of the EP in “appointments” 
is also of relevance. Currently, the European Parliament is neither involved 
in the nomination or appointment of the High Representative nor in the 
choice of special envoys and representatives or any other post in ESDP. 
Nevertheless, the EP’s approval of the European Commission’s president 
followed by the entire Commission (Article 214 TEC) can be evaluated as 
 
32  Inter-institutional arrangement of 6 May 1999. OJ C 172/9.  
33  The respective contributions are referring to the national GDP. 
34  See for the background Ramses A. Wessel: The European Union’s Foreign and Se-
curity Policy. A Legal Institutional Perspective, The Hague 1999, pp. 220-223.  
35  Marta Dassù/Antonio Missiroli: More Europe in Foreign and Security Policy: The 
Institutional Dimension of CFSP, in: The International Spectator 2 (2002), pp. 79-
88.  Jürgen Mittag 
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a step towards participation in appointments implying also relevance for 
foreign matters. By means of the “hearings” (not yet legally recognised in 
the TEC) of the individual Commissioners − including the Commissioner 
for external relations − the EP has succeeded at least on a small scale in 
expanding its authority vis-à-vis one institution of the European Union.  
Parliamentary Cooperation and Internal Organisation 
An overall weakness of national parliamentary institutions in security and 
defence issues cannot be overlooked. Though some parliaments have con-
siderable competences in the preparation of resolutions and the decision on 
the deployment of forces, their involvement in security and defence poli-
cies has usually an ex post character. National parliaments in general are 
able to exercise oversight a posteriori − especially via their budgetary com-
petences. But they have neither developed into an equal player nor into a 
forum for diplomatic initiatives or international negotiations.  
Nevertheless, the cooperation with national parliaments could be consid-
ered as an important gateway for the European Parliament to gain better 
information opportunities in the framework of ESDP. But these informa-
tion channels have not been used widely. Despite the more or less satisfy-
ing information by the Commissioner in charge of external affairs and the 
High Representative, there are hardly any contacts with national represen-
tatives relevant for the Parliamentarians in ESDP matters. In particular the 
heterogeneity and plurality of the European Parliament as well as the wide 
range of tasks restrict the time budget for intensive attenion for the national 
arenas. Moreover, the European Parliamentarians are only scarcely pre-
sented in the inner-state decision groups of national parliaments and par-
ties.  
Two institutionalised forms of cooperation have been developed: on the 
one hand, the Conference of the Parliament Presidents (since 1981)
36 and 
on the other hand, the COSAC (Conférence des Organes spécialisées en 
 
36  The Conference of Speakers of Parliaments of the European Union is based on an 
initiative by former EP president Gaetano Martino. The first conference came to pass 
in January 1963. 1975 it was set on a regular basis by (two-year) intervals.  Escaping the Legitimacy-Accountability-Trap? 
  19
Affaires communautaires, since 1989).
37 These two fora remained, how-
ever, without any considerable impact for several years. Although COSAC 
was re-valued by the Amsterdam Treaty and even though it is the only in-
stitutionalised body of national parliaments, its profile remains poor up to 
the present − both in general and particularly in view of security and de-
fence politics. Contacts to member states’ politicians are predominantly 
based on personal strings; a real and efficient coordination cannot be spo-
ken of.  
In contrast to the formalised collaboration in the framework of COSAC and 
the bilateral relations of national parliaments, the 1990s have seen more 
intense informal contacts between the national parliaments and the Euro-
pean Parliament.
38 Especially at the committees’ level, often joint sessions 
of the EP and national parliaments that can be traced back to initiatives of 
the European Parliament are held. As Andreas Maurer has pointed out, the 
European Parliament invites frequently national parliaments to hold bilateral 
and multilateral meetings between specialised committees. These contacts 
between the European Parliament and national parliaments have grown from 
three or four a year in the late 1980s and early 1990s towards 20 to 25 in the 
late 1990s.
39  
Another component of parliamentary participation in ESDP affairs relates 
to the internal parliamentary organisation. While it is reasonable for the 
general aspects of European Security and Defence Policy to be discussed in 
the plenary, it seems difficult to apply such an understanding to individual 
 
37  COSAC was established in November 1989 in Paris. It was first based on the con-
ference of the EU committees. A decision was taken by the conference of presidents 
of the member state parliament and of the European Parliament. It was agreed that a 
body should be created, in which those national parliaments that had already in-
stalled a EU committee, − were able to dispatch its Europe-related representatives 
in order to act by a more intensive cooperation among each other and also with the 
European Parliament. Especially, a better exchange of information and a mutual 
support in the national work on Europe were envisioned.  
38  See for details Andreas Maurer: Parlamentarische Demokratie in der Europäischen 
Union, Baden-Baden 2002.  
39  In addition, on inquiry of national committees, bilateral meetings with the respec-
tive committee of the EP have been held in order to provide the national committee 
with background information. Jürgen Mittag 
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actions or declarations. It seems necessary to differentiate more specifically 
whether the Parliament in its entire composition should be involved or 
whether it should be the defence specialists who are addressed. As the EP’s 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and De-
fence Policy (AFET) covers an extremely wide range of policy fields − 
from the accession process of the candidate countries to the EU’s relations 
with the South Caucasus − the internal committee structure of the European 
Parliament has already been revised in order to provide a more efficient 
way of coping with the heavy workload. With the new election term in 
2004 a subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) − consisting of 30 
parliamentarians, mostly members of AFET − has been re-invented.
40 The 
new committee has already taken up its task of engaging in discussions on 
the evolution of European Security and Defence Policy as well as scrutinis-
ing ESDP missions. Though the institutionalisation of this new body might 
provide the basis for a higher intensity for debate with EP’s counterparts in 
the Commission and the Council it remains to bee seen whether the com-
mittee will be able to give the European Parliament a stronger public say in 
discussions on defence policy. The debate on the mission to the presidential 
and parliamentary elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 
European Parliament on 23 March 2006 has so far only obtained little at-
tention by the public.  
Summarising all these aspects it can be concluded that the European Par-
liament does not yet play a substantial role in the European Union’s secu-
rity and defence policy-making. Since formal powers of the European 
Parliament in this field are extremely poor, the EP should − in terms of le-
gitimacy − claim to reinforce its power at all levels but particularly in order 
to enhance control and accountability. 
 
40  A sub-committee on Security and Disarmament has already existed in the fourth 
parliamentarian term 1994-1999. See for the background Catriona Gourlay/Malin 
Tappert: Revising the European Parliament’s Scrutiny of foreign affairs and de-
fence, in: European Security Review 21 (2004).  Escaping the Legitimacy-Accountability-Trap? 
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Ten Options for Parliamentary Participation in ESDP 
Without a substantial oversight of the EP European Security and Defence 
Policy even in future will lack the parliamentary dimension that has be-
come the backdrop against which national parliaments conduct the scrutiny 
of “their” governments. All in all, it seems reasonable that the actors at the 
European level − be it the European Commission, the High Representative, 
the Council or the Political and Security Committee − should have to take 
into consideration that they will eventually be held to accountable by the 
European Parliament, effectively controlling the decisions taken and the 
initiatives started. Based on the notion of filling the missing link at the EU 
level a set of options for institutional changes in ESDP and a potential 
stronger involvement of the European Parliament will be offered for dis-
cussion:
41  
1.  In the ongoing “period of reflection” − which followed the crisis after 
the people in France and the Netherlands voted against the constitution, 
whereas Britain opted to postpone a referendum − the European Parlia-
ment has to focus stronger on a revision of Article 21 TEU. Since the 
objective of Article 21 is limited to the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, a parliamentary dimension of CFSP/ESDP requires a particular 
reference to ESDP. Particularly the term ESDP should find its way into 
the Treaties proper. This might help to break the artificial distinction be-
tween CFSP and ESDP matters. A more workable method might be to 
differentiate e.g. between long-term strategies including their conduct 
and strictly military operations.  
2.  The appointing functions of the European Parliament so far have only 
been developed in a fairly restricted way. Hence, since the High Repre-
sentative has obtained a key role in CFSP and ESDP, the European Par-
liament should become more involved in his or her appointment. At 
least the need to consult the EP along similar lines to the ECB-
investiture should be invented. In terms of legitimacy in ESDP matters, Jürgen Mittag 
22   
the assent of the European Parliament appears even more desirable, as it 
is applicable for the Commission. 
3.  The right of information on ESDP issues can be considered the most 
notably aspect of efficient parliamentary participation. In this respect, 
the links of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy with the Council 
and its bodies should be improved along the lines of the inter-
institutional agreement of November 2002. It would be especially useful 
for the Parliament to establish links to the PSC as it is envisaged to a 
certain degree in the 2005 confirmation of the inter-institutional agree-
ment, guaranteeing now “timely information on both the recent and 
forthcoming developments and their budgetary implications”.
42 The EP 
should claim the right to obtain access not only to decisions that the 
Council intends to adopt but also to all other information related to for-
eign, security or military actions in order to gain a more comprehensive 
overview.  
4.  To carry out legal acts, parliaments generally must not only have the 
leeway to formulate their position on all proposals for legal measures, 
but also the right to approve or to reject what the executive has pro-
posed. Hence, the European Parliament should claim a formal participa-
tion − at least in terms of consultation − in civil crisis management 
rather than military crisis management. Although a distinction between 
civil and military means might prove difficult in a case-to-case evalua-
tion, the European Parliament should focus on the civil dimension of 
EU security and defence policy including crisis management by non-
military means as defined in Annex I of the Presidency Report in Feira 
on strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy 
and in Annex 2 to Annex IV of the Helsinki Conclusions. 
 
41  This set of options is based on a study which had been carried out by the author in a 
team of EU experts on behalf of the European Parliament in 2002/2003 (No. 
IV/2002/01/01).  
42  See the Agreement in Trialogue on certain elements regarding the future budget for 
2006, Press Release on 1 December 2005 of the Council (15243/05 (Presse 338)).  Escaping the Legitimacy-Accountability-Trap? 
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5.  The European Parliament should as well focus on a revision of the crite-
ria under which the defence budget is drawn up. Currently, operations, 
“having military or defence implications”, have to be financed by the 
member states. Based on the relevant accords, the EP should stress that 
the common costs including both operational and administrative expen-
ditures should no longer be financed jointly by the member states but by 
the EC budget. This would provide the European Parliament with an in-
strument of indirect control that it can exert through its rights to partici-
pate in the drafting of the EC budget. In practical terms, this might be 
carried out by a decision on the overall costs of the EP at the beginning 
of the budget procedure, which will then be distributed by the Council 
to single positions.  
6.  Basic parliamentary involvement in ESDP affairs is a product of “ac-
cess”, thus requiring efficient and comprehensive information channels. 
In practice, a lot of information has to be obtained from the national 
level. Thus, the European Parliament should improve co-operation and 
exchange of information with national parliaments by setting up some 
kind of working contacts at Committee level or − for more general is-
sues − a policy-oriented sub-COSAC related to foreign, security and de-
fence issues. It is recommended that more efficient ties in day-to-day 
politics and a specialised EP-based parliamentary conference on foreign, 
security and defence policy should ensure efficiency and a better per-
formance in day-to-day-policies than the current COSAC is able to of-
fer.  
7.  From a general view, the involvement of national parliaments of the EU 
member states in defence issues can be considered as weak and for the 
most part reactive. There are even countries without any formal parlia-
mentary rights on the deployment of forces abroad. For this reason, it 
seems necessary that national parliaments start a learning process shift-
ing their attention to higher degree towards Brussels. This might be 
achieved by entering into a benchmarking exercise looking at minimum 
standards for best practices of national legislatures in foreign, security 
and defence policy. Jürgen Mittag 
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8.  With the transfer of tasks, the WEU has become a comparatively “inac-
tive” organisation. Though the Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU has 
refused to accept the institution’s demise, the European Parliament 
should insist that the mandate of the Western European Union and its 
parliamentary assembly expires. The remaining competences of the 
WEU should be transferred entirely to the EU. In this case, the mutual 
assistance clause of the Treaty on the Western European Union might 
reasonably be placed in the European treaties − similar to the provisions 
of the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”. This would im-
ply a collective defence mechanism for the EU in the event of an attack 
(or act of terrorism) against any member state.  
9.  The relationship of the EU with NATO is a key element for ESDP, es-
pecially given the growing urgency to deploy military forces. The Euro-
pean Parliament has already increased its attention for NATO since its 
“Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly” has 
come together in 2005 for six times compared to two times in 2004. 
Nevertheless, direct communication with NATO and NATO member 
states has to be improved. At least a semi-annual regular meeting be-
tween representatives of the European Parliament and representatives of 
the NATO Parliamentary Assembly should be agreed upon. Moreover, 
it seems necessary that the European Parliament should push for the 
conclusion of the elusive agreement between the EU and NATO on col-
laboration in military crises management.  
10.    Since AFET is still concerned to a large degree with questions of 
enlargement, the work of the Committee should concentrate more effec-
tively on security and defence aspects in the future, as has internally al-
ready been initiated with the invention of a Subcommittee on Security 
and Defence. In the long run, AFET should also broaden its efforts to 
make the public more aware and sensible what issues in external affairs 
are covered at the European level in order to develop a broader dis-
course on CFSP/ESDP issues. 
Considering the strong political pressure by the EU member states govern-
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with the development of ESDP it seems necessary that the parliamentary 
dimension will strike new paths. With European integration ever more pro-
gressing, the member states will find it increasingly difficult to avoid revis-
ing the role of the European Parliament, by giving this body an even 
greater role in decision-making. That will make the European Parliament − 
at least in a long-term perspective − a more relevant actor in European Se-
curity and Defence Policy. The probably most effective weapon of the par-
liaments is to arouse public opinion.  
Since communication structures in the European Union still relate to the 
national sphere it seems inevitable that legitimacy and accountability will 
be shared between the European Parliament and the national parliaments on 
the basis of their respective rights and room for manoeuvres under the rele-
vant treaties and constitutions. Accordingly, it is a joint task to ensure effi-
cient cooperation and communication means. Although some national 
parliaments are reluctant to grant further rights to the European Parliament 
in (CFSP and) ESDP, the question of working links between national par-
liaments and the European Parliament might be a key for a coherent and 
efficient parliamentary dimension of European Security and Defence Pol-
icy in the near future − facilitating the European Union to escape from the 
legitimacy-accountability-trap.  
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